Police were caught napping by Gen Z protesters in Parliament

The invasion of Parliament on June 25 caught anti-riot police deployed to suppress protesters by huge surprise.

It seemed they never anticipated a scenario where the demonstrators would storm into the august House – after all, countless protests have been witnessed in the capital city, and rarely did unarmed demonstrators storm Parliament.

But the Gen Z protesters pulled a fast one on the armed officers. They were caught napping, belatedly reacting with brutal force that led to avoidable casualties.

The security breach at Parliament as legislators passed the Finance Bill 2024, which was soon rejected by President William Ruto, exposed the police’s underbelly in terms of preparedness and response.

Police commanders, with the benefit of doubt, either never anticipated such an unprecedented moment or underestimated the strength and capability of the Gen Z demonstrators.

Armed with mobile phones, placards and bottles of water, the protesters broke through the security cordon, storming Parliament where MPs had just concluded passing the controversial Bill, which had proposed punitive taxes amid a high cost of living.

The invasion resulted in the deaths of 39-year-old software engineer David Chege, Ericsson Mutisya, 25, a butcher and Eric Shieni, a 27-year-old finance student.

Security analysts blame the killings on a broken command chain, poor planning and coordination. They further cite intelligence oversight, excessive use of force, human rights violations, lack of accountability and militarisation of civilian response as some of the failures that contributed to the security breach at Parliament.

According to Clayton Omwanga, a security risk analyst, police had the opportunity to de-escalate the violence but did the opposite by provoking the protesters through use of excess force. The former police officer blames a disjointed command chain and poor decision-making by commanders for the fatal shootings.

“In the Standing Order, the riot drill is clear on how to manage riots. For instance, if fire is to be opened, then the order must be issued by the commander in charge of the squad but not indiscriminate shootings like what transpired during the Gen Z protests,” says Omwanga.

A clear chain of command is essential in communicating, maintaining discipline and accountability – a standard practice that was lacking during the protests, according to Omwanga.

“And that’s why, up to date, we still do not know the officers who shot the three men, nor is it clear who their commanders were. Had command and control been clear, it would be very easy to finger out the culprits and commanders responsible for the fatal shootings,” he explains.

The use of unjustifiable force was uncalled for, says Omwanga, especially after the protesters showed no signs of violence in the early stages of the demonstration. He claims the anti-riot officers provoked them when they unleashed brutality.

“That force was unnecessary; it angered the protestors, some whom eventually stormed into Parliament in scenes never seen before in a capital city that has witnessed protests since the agitation in the 90s, of multi-party politics,” he adds.

The Gen Z protestors brought down part of the perimeter fence, storming parliament buildings to the shock of MPs who had to flee for safety, leaving the August House temporarily in the hands of the unarmed demonstrators.

The protestors who had largely remained peaceful in the better part of the morning, raided parliament in anger after the MPs pushed through the Finance Bill.

In their hundreds, they broke windows and doors making their way into the chambers in unforeseen scenes that left parts of parliament damaged. The building was partially set on fire, which was contained immediately.

In response security agents inside Parliament opened fire, killing Chege, Mutisya and Shieni.

The fatal shootings, says security consultant, Enock Alumasi Makanga, could have been avoided had commanders done proper risk assessments ahead of the crucial activity in the August House where MPs were voting on the Finance Bill.

He says the deployment was underwhelming, police underrated the protestors as well as ignoring tell-tale signs on social media platforms.

“The commanders underestimated the strength of the protestors, and that’s why they never bothered to deploy adequate numbers of the ground. I doubt whether any risk assessment was done, and that is why they restored to brutal force in response,” noted Dr Makanga.

Law enforcement may use reasonable force when attempting to overcome resistance, effect arrest, prevent escape, in case of self-defense, and protection of life and property.

The Constitution and National Police Act, 2011, allows use of force as a last resort, but the force must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense, resistance offered, and the objective to be achieved.

According to the Six Schedule of National Police Service Act, an officer shall always attempt to use non-violent means first and force may only be employed when non-violent means are ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended outcome.

The force used shall be proportional to the objective to be achieved, the seriousness of the offence, and the resistance of the person against whom it is used, and only to the extent necessary while adhering to the provisions of the law and the Standing Orders.

And when the use of force results in injuries, the police officers present are required to provide medical assistance immediately and unless there are good reasons, failing to do so shall be a criminal offence.

“Any use of force that leads to death, serious injury and other grave consequences shall be reported immediately by the officer in charge or another direct superior of the person who caused the death or injury, to the Independent Police Oversight Authority who shall investigate the case,” states Section 5.

This breach at Parliament, according to George Musamali, another security analyst, exposed security gaps and failures overlooked by commanders.  

“From my observation, there was no coordination among the responding agencies. A clear indication that a joint operations committee, a standard practice, was not established to coordinate response activities across the country,” says the former General Service Unit (GSU) instructor.  

He is of the view that different units were deployed under different commands without set out operational plans, akin to what happened in 2007/8 post post-election violence.

“It is clear the IG (Japhet Koome) was not in charge and in control of the operation. Indiscipline among the police units was also a major contributor to the fiasco. The code of dress when dealing with demonstrations was not followed and officers came out in uniforms that were not gazetted, making it difficult to identify and control them,” he notes.